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Business As Usual: Insurance and September II
Richa1d john Hawkinst
While the monetary impact on the American insurance industry remains unparalleled, the legal impact of September II, with regards to
war risk exclusion, 1·emains as always: business as usual.

espite their differences in virtually every aspect, George W.
Bush and Osama Bin Laden hold strikingly similar opinions
on matters of war. According to a 1998 statement by Bin Laden,
"what we do care for is to please God .. . by doing jihad in his cause
and by liberating Isl.am's holy places from those wretched cowards."'
Several years and four devastating hijackings later, President Bush
unequivocally declared that "on September the uth, enemies of
freedom committed an act of war against our country. " 1 Both Bush
and Bin Laden consider the other's actions acts of war; both are defending their nations and people; both have declared war against
the foreign enemy, both agree that a state of war exists.
The House Financial Services Committee and Insurance Subcommittee, however, disagree with both the President and Bin
Laden. In a September 2001 letter addressed to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the Committee stated:
"Through necessity our government is expressing America's outrage through words of war, but this rhetoric reflects the passion
and determination of our country, not the legal reality of Tuesday's

D

t Richard Hawkins is a junior majoring in economics. He is from Provo, Utah, and plans
to attend law school after gmduating next year.
1
George W Bush, Address to a Joim Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/ releaseshoot/09hOOI0920-8.htm>, 2. December
2002..

' John Miller, ABC News Interview with Osama Bin Laden, May 1998, <http://
abcnews.go.com/secrions/world/DailyNews/transcript_bindladen3_98I22.8.htmb, 2 Decem-

ber 2002.
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destruction. Any acrempt co evade coverage obligations by either
primary insurers or reinsurers based on such legal maneuvering
would not only be unsupportable and unpatriotic-it would tear at
the faith of the American people in the insurance industry." 3 As far
as the House Finance Subcommittee was concerned, no war existed
and the insurance industry was to conduct business as usual.
Even as the nation confronted the worst disaster in U .S. history,
the insurance indusrry confronted the worst monetary disaster in its
history. Before the attack, Hurricane Andrew ranked as the most expensive insurance disaster at $20 billion. 4 Early damage estimates of
September u ranged from $40 billion ro $IOO billion.s Despite the
unparalleled losses caused by this "act of war," many insurance companies soon declared that they would not invoke the war risk exclusion as a means of denying coverage for damages related to the attacks. In other words, insurers agreed with the House Financial
Services Committee that the events of September n were not warlike, and the industry would not deny coverage.
To understand the committee's and industry's response, it is important to know that a typical insurance company exempts itself
from coverage for many different risks that would be too costly for
the insurer to assume. For example, standard exemptions include
asbestos, preexisting health conditions, and suicide.6 Nestled among
the many exemptions is the war risk exclusion, typically denying
coverage for
Hostile or warlike action in rime of peace or war, including action
in hindering, combating, or defending against an actual, impending or expected arrack (i) by any government or sovereign power
(de jure or de facto), or by any authority maintaining or using

' Jun Bc:tmein, Scuentc:nt cf Minneooo Collllt~ Colnntilsioner Jim Bemsttin, <http://www.
conunerce.state.mn.us/pages!NcwsRdeases/Rdc:aS\vcnooiiNewsorQ924.htm>, 2 Dccxmber 2002.
• Adjusted :woo dollars.
' Marrin Katz, "The Cost of Oaims," <http://lcgamedia.net/legapracticc/akin-gump
l1oo2I02·0023_kan_martin_cost-of-the-claims>, 2 December 2002.
• Spencer L. Kimball, C:zsa and Marmals on lnsruunr~ Law (Boston: Little, Brown and
Comp:~ny. 1992), 340, 451- 54, 422-23.
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military, naval or air forces; or (ii) by military, naval or air forces;
or (iii) by an agent of any such government power, authority or
forces. Insurrection, rebellion, civil war, usurped powers or action
taken by governmental authorities in hindering, combating or defending against such an occurrence; seizure or destruction against
quarantine or customs regulations, confiscation by order of any
government or public authority, or risks of contraband or illegal
transportation or trade. 7
The insurance industry's response Ill granting coverage after
September n may have been motivated by humanitarian compassion and concern for national welfare, but their actions in granting
coverage are also based on legal precedent set forth in two important insurance-related cases. Landmark decisions in both Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty dr Surety Company and Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Company held that insurance
companies were not liable for damages incurred by non-warlike
activities.
On 6 September 1970, two hijackers from the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine took control of Pan American flight 083
in the airspace above London. The 747 aircraft, en route from
Brussels to New York, was redirected to Beirut and subsequently to
Cairo. After the evacuation of the passengers, explosives experts
blew up the airplane. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company tried to
deny coverage, invoking the war risk exclusion included in Pan
American's policy. The United States Court of Appeals for rhe Second Circuit ruled that the war risk exclusion did nor apply to the
hijacking incident. According to the court, the Pan American incident did not constitute a warlike operation because it was perpetrated by a non-government entity "upon civilian citizens of nonbelligerent powers and their property ... at places far removed from
the locale or the subject of any warfare." In summary, the court
concluded that in the case of Pan American, "the destructive action
7

Couch on Insurance§ 48:131, quoted in Matthew F. Adler, Deborah H. Cohen, and
Edward T. Groh, "Terrorism: The 'New War' in Insurance Agreements," The Brief 31, no. 3
(Spring 2002): 19, 17.

48

BRIGHAM YoUNG UNIVERSITY PRELAW

REviEw

(Vol. 17

ts nor coercion or conquest in any sense, bu t rhe striking of s pec~
tacular blows for propaganda effects . " 8
Thus, two central questions addressed by the court emerged as
the s tandard by "which future cases would be decided. Firs t, what
constitutes an insurrection with intent ro overthrow, and rwo, when
does a group possess sovereignty or quasi~gove rnm e ntal status s uffi ~
cien r ro qualify an action as an act of war?" 9 The court denied evi~
dence of both , and Pan American World Airways received $25 mil ~
lion from Aetna. 10
Nine years after the ruling in Pan American, the United States
Dis trict Court for the Southern District of New York addressed a
similar question in Holiday Inns over damages incurred during a six
month uprising b etween Palestinians and Liberal Nationalists in
Beirut. The court, using arguments and wording similar to the Pan
American opinion, denied the merits of the exclusion. T he insurer
fail ed ro prove sufficient sovereignty of the group ro classify the
events as warlike.
With legal precedent set in both Pan American and Holiday
Inns, there appears to be little that insurers can do to avoid cover~
age. Yet, rhe type of attacks perperuated on September u is un~
precedented historically and distinctly different from the past
events challenged in court, wherein the exemption did not apply.
Several characteristics of September II differentiate the event
from previous isolated hijackings and uprisings examined by the
co urts with regard to war risk exclusion . First, the attack was com~
posed of four separate, bur coordinated attacks aimed ar desrroying
rh e financial, mili tary, and, we assume, political centers of the
United States. Second, the attacks were perpetrated by foreigners on
American soil, unlike any previous attack since Pearl H arbor. Third,
no hijacking or uprising has matched the September II attacks in
• Pan Amtrican \VttrU Ainuays, l11C. v. Aetna Casuaky & Su"ry Co. 505 F2o (ui Cir. 1974),
1015- 1016.
• Adler, Cohen, and Groh, 19.
10
"1nsunnce Industry Begins ro Sorr Our WfCTangle," Long Island Business News. 21-27
September 2001, <lmp://www.qu:~clrinoschwartt.com/LIBN-SEPT-2002.htm>, 2 December
2002.
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magnitude of either civilian life lost or monetary damage done.
Fourth, the attacks resulted in a U.S. retaliatory overthrow of the
Afghanistan Taliban government and similar threats against other
governments suspected of funding terrorist cells. There is even evidence that at one time Osama Bin Laden may have been appointed
Defense Minister under the Taliban. 11 Fifth, the al Qaeda organization responsible for the attacks is not a small group of independent
radicals. Rather, it is a vast network of tens of thousands of adherents, often referred to as an army because of extensive military and
philosophical training. 12 Lastly, in 1998 Bin Laden declared an official jihad against the United States and allies of Israel, which led
one scholar to wonder how t he dedaration of a "holy war" by a
religious body is any different than the declarat ion of war by
a legislative body. 13 Consequen dy, the circumstances surrounding
September II differ significantly fom those surrounding either Pan
American or Holiday Inns.
The application of the war risk exclusion to the September I I
attacks has some limited legal precedent of its own. The United
States District Court for the District of Delaware allowed for the
application of the war risk exclusion in TRTIFTC Communications,
Inc. v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. On 20 December 1989, one day after the U.S invasion of Panama, TRT /FTC
Communications was burglarized by eight armed but civiliandressed individuals in the business district of Panama City. The
court decided that
the eight men who robbed the TRT facility in Panama City on
December 21, 1989, were pare of some arm of the Panamanian
government's forces involved in the war effort. However, regardless of whether the men were part of the Panamanian forces or a
band of looters, there is ample evidence ro support the conclusion
"Carl J. Pernicone and James Deaver, "T. H. Insurance Implications of the World Trade
Center Disaster,n The Btief 31, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 26.
11
Adler, Cohen, and Groh, 19.
') Randy J. Ma.nUoff, "The War Risk Exclusion-Looking beyond the Events of September lith," <http://www.cpmy.com/arrides/war.htmb, 2 December 2002.
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that their actions againsl T RT were enabled by the military hostilities occurring between Panama and the United States. 14
Thus, if the insurers can prove that t he attacks of September 11 were
provoked by military hostilities occurring during the Afghanistan
bombings in 1998, or the ongoing Iraqi conflict, whether the attackers constituted a part of any nation's government forces or n or,
denial of coverage would not be unprecedented.
Although cases challenging the war exemption seem unlikely,
the courts should see no shortage of insurance cases related to the
September 11 attacks. Most cases and claims will involve business
interruption coverage. A drawn-out dispute determining whether
the attacks consri tured one occurrence's as the insurers argue, or
two occurrences as the insured claim, should also keep the owners
and insurers of the World Trade Center involved for years to come. 16
Barring the invocation of the war risk exclusion, the court's future
decision on the one-two occurrence issue will constitute the most
important legal impact of September u on the insurance industry.
W ith no insurance companies willing to test the war risk exclusion precedents set forth by Pan American and Holiday Inns, there is
little prospect of any redefinition of the terms sovereign ty, insurrection, or act of war by the courts. Any future attacks could qualify under war risk exclusion because insurers could argue that they
are retaliatory actions in response to American hostilities in
Afghanistan and t he Middle Ease. With no insurer willing to risk commercial suicide over such an extremely sensitive and nationalistic
" Ibid.
as Swiss Re, one of the building's policy insurers, included a coverage limit on any individual occurrence. The policy smtes that "'occurrence' shall mean all losses or damage that are atrriburable directly or indirectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses
will be added together and the total amount of such losses will be treated as one occurrence
irres~crive of the period of time or area over which such losses occur." The limit would
restrict coverage to $3.6 billio n total, as opposed to $J.6 billion for each rower. See Michael
F. Aylward, ~Twin Towers: The $J.6 Billion Quesrion Arising from the World Trade Center Atmcks," Difense C()unselj()urnal (April 2.001): 169-71.
10
Ten years after the 1993 bombing of d\e World Trade Center, many of the 500 lawsuirs
and insurance claims fi led are still unserrled. See Kan, "The Cosr of C laims."
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event as September 11, the opportuniry to reexamine and invoke the
war risk exclusion of the nation's insurance policies may well have
passed. Indeed, the November 2002 passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act which extends coverage, limits insurers' losses, and provides for federal bailout for terrorist acts may well render the issue
irrelevant. While the monetary impact on the American insurance
industry remains unparalleled, the legal impact of September 11,
with regards to war risk exclusion, remains as always: business as
usual.

